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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
8 LARAE VICTOR, 
9 Plaintiff, 
10 ¥.s. 
11 MELVIN JAY J. ABBOT, 
12 Defendant. 
13 
ORDER 
Civil No. !oc3d-...O 
14 Upon motion of Harold A. Hintze, attorney for the Defendant, 
15 the court being duly advised in the premises thereof and good 
16 cause appearing therefore 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Plaintif,,,,f' s Complain_t be ....ztZt!_ 
• /} ~ ~~..A~ (;fl.-~~- f}-L4/l'i,<...1-44R~\.,l..; --~-
stricken. ~,~~~ ~· 
17 
18 
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19 r-{Done this -i-. J day of ~-€-ct-AL-.. , 197 8. 
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20 
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26 
27 
BY THE COURT: 
~~2~~ IS TRI CTJUDGE 
STATE ·Of UTAH ) ss. 
County of Duchesne ) 
I, Janet Cowan, Clerk of Duchesne County, Uta~ 
and ex-officio Clerk of the District Court, do hereby 
certify that tho above and fore1Jo:ng is a full, true 
and correct copy -:::f the or:j'.nal document which is on 
file in my office. 
).,. .... ~ ........ ,. ... L. 0 ~ ... ..,C I L .. - ..... ,1 ...... 4 L J J 
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MELVIN J. ABBOTT, 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff-
Responden t, 
vs. 
LaRAE VICTOR, 
(a/k/a LaRae Parkes), 
Defendant-
Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 16931 
This action was brought by Respondent against Appellant 
seeking recognition of a 1972 Mexican divorce and seeking an 
order approving the property settlement agreed upon and signed by 
the parties in October of 1973. (T. 3, 40, 41.) Appellant, by 
way of Amended Answer, admitted the Mexican divorce but made 
no counterclaim regarding the property settlement. (T. 20) 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court allowed Appellant to introduce testimony and 
evidence regarding the property settlement even though no counter-
claim was filed. The court entered judgment in favor of Respondent 
as to the property settlement stating: 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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[d]efendant ... has by her conduct abandoned 
any and all claims for rescission or voidance 
of the terms and provisions of the settlement 
agreement entered into on October 10, 1973; 
and she is by her conduct barred and estopped 
from seeking relief therefrom in this action. 
(Conclusions of Law, Paragraph 2.) 
The court awarded Appellant custody of the parties' three minor 
children and child support of $100.00 per month per child. The 
only subject of this appeal is the trial court's decision as it 
relates to the property settlement, as Respondent acknowledges 
the propriety and jurisdiction of the court to amend, modify, 
alter or change the child custody and support provisions of the 
property agreement. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to have the judgment of the trial court 
affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Respondent Melvin J. Abbott and Appellant LaRae Victor (aka 
LaRae Parkes), were married in Salt Lake City on August 15, 1959. 
(T. 35) Four children were born as issue of the marriage, three 
of whom are still minors in Appellant's custody. (Findings of 
Fact, Paragraph 1) In 1962 the couple moved to Mr. Abbott's 
father's dairy farm in Duchesne County which was the couple's 
main homestead from 1962 to 1972. (T. 37) During this period 
LaRae separated from Mr. Abbott on several occasions for time 
periods of up to six months; also, the couple spent two years of 
this time peri·6d in Phoenix. (T. 58) 
-2-
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In September of 1972 the parties obtained a Mexican divorce. 
The divorce Decree did not attempt to divide the property or deal 
with child custody. (T. 4) The parties talked periodically 
about a property settlement during the year which followed their 
divorce, but no agreement was reached. (T. 39-40) 
Less than a year after the divorce, Mrs. Abbott married 
Robert Leroy Ringham. (T. 32) She and her second husband 
decided to go to Singapore. (T. 40) Shortly before they left, 
Mr. Abbott and LaRae were able to work out a property settlement. 
(T. 40-41) 
Appellant admitted at trial that between the time of the 
Mexican divorce and the signing of the property agreement she had 
"talked to different lawyers" regarding what her position was or 
should be in regard to the settlement. (T. 50) Later in trial, 
she claimed she was confused as to when she actually talked with 
attorneys regarding the settlement agreement and stated "I don't 
know whether it was before or after [the date the agreement was 
signed] on that." (T. 50-51) 
Mr. Abbott retained David Sam (now Judge Sam) to draw up the 
property settlement. (T. 47,50) Appellant read the agreement 
and manifested her acceptance of it by signing it on October 10, 
1973. {T. 31, 40-41) The agreement, however, was never sub-
mitted for approval by the court. The agreement provided LaRae 
with a mobile home that was purchased by Mr. Abbott at a cost of 
$15,669.40. In addition to purchasing the home, Mr. Abbott paid 
for the set up charges. (T. 49) The agreement al.so gave LaRae a 
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two year old Ford LTD and $50.00 a month per child for child 
support. (See, Settlement Agreement attached to Respondent's 
Complaint as Exhibit "B.") Respondent received all the assets 
and debts relating to the operation of the farm plus the fol-
lowing: 
1. 1963 Cadillac (10 years old). 
2. 1955 Ford Fairlane (18 years old). 
3. Hydroswift boat purchased used for $1,000. 
4. Cemetary lot. 
5. Suzuki motorcycle. 
6. 334 shares of Western General Dairies, Class D stock. 
7. Highland Dairy stock, 159 shares Class A stock; 
454 shares Class C stock. 
(T. 27, 28; Settlement Agreement attached 
to Respondent's Complaint as Exhibit "B") 
Following the signing of the settlement agreement, LaRae 
remained married to Mr. Ringham for another eleven months where-
upon she divorced him in September of 1974 and was married to 
Eugene G. Victor that same month. This third marriage lasted two 
years, ending in divorce in September of 1976. LaRae married a 
fourth time in February of 1978. At the time of the trial, 
November 28, 1979, LaRae was separated from Mr. Parkes and had 
filed for divorce. (T. 32-33, 53) No evidence was offered 
relative to property settlements or alimony payments made or due 
under any of these divorces. 
In 1977 Appellant filed suit against Respondent seeking to 
-4-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
have the settlement agreement amended or set aside and to have an 
"equitable division" made of the property. (Victor ~ Abbott, 
No. 6320, Duchesne County.) Appellant did not pursue her action. 
Mr. Abbott's attorney noticed her deposition twice but each time 
Appellant failed to appear and to tell her attorney where she 
was. (T. 11) On September 25, 1978 a motion was granted to 
strike her complaint without prejudice. (See Exhibit "B" of 
Appellant's Brief). 
Mr. Abbott filed this instant action in November of 1978 
primarily seeking adjudication of a court-ordered support payment 
so that the Welfare Department would know what his monthly obli-
gations were, and seeking an order approving the property settle-
ment the parties had lived with for five years. In addition, he 
sought judicial recognition of the Mexican divorce. At the 
trial, held November 28, 1979, the District Court heard testimony 
concerning the factual setting of the 1973 property settlement 
and the conduct of the parties since that time. In the court's 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, dated January 14, 1980, 
the court found that the parties had lived pursuant to the pro-
perty settlement for the past six years, that Appellant's prior 
action had been dismissed by her failure to attend her deposition 
and that the parties had conducted themselves in such a way as to 
constitute an acceptance and reliance of the property settlement. 
(Findings of Fact, Paragraphs 4-6) The court entered Judgment on 
January 14, 1980 in favor of Respondent stating that the property 
agreement entered into between the parties on October 10, 1973 
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insofar as it pertained to division of the marital property 
"is hereby valid and enforceable •.. the said defendant having 
abandoned any action to void said agreement 2£1 !?.i: her conduct, 
having been estopped from asserting any claim for voidance 
thereof." (Judgment, Paragraph 1) (emphasis added) The court 
did modify the agreement by raising the child support from $50 
to $100 per month per child and by awarding custody of the 
children to LaRae (Abbott) Parkes. 
ARGUMENT 
In this appeal, Appellant gives three reasons why the 
decision of the trial court should be reversed. First, the 
Appellant alleges that an involuntary dismissal of a complaint, 
without prejudice, does not constitute abandonment of a claim 
raised therein so as to estop the Appellant from raising the 
claim as a defendant in a subsequent action. The Respondent's 
reply to this allegation is addressed in Point I. 
Second, Appellant alleges the evidence is totally insuffi-
cient to support the finding that Appellant is estopped from 
seeking an equitable distribution of the parties' marital pro-
perty. Respondent's address to this claim is Point II. 
Finally, Appellant alleges that she is entitled to an 
equitable division of the marital property by the District Court 
even if the division differs from the terms of the settlement 
agreement. This issue is addressed in Point III. 
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POINT I 
AN INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF APPELLANT'S 
COMPLAINT WITHOUT PREJUDICE IN A PRIOR 
ACTION IS ONE FACTOR A JUDGE MAY CONSIDER 
IN DETERMINING WHETHER TO APPLY THE DOCTRINES 
OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL AND LACHES TO BAR A 
CLAIM COMMON TO THE PRIOR AND INSTANT ACTION 
Respondent does not take issue with Appellant's argument 
that an involuntary dismissal of a complaint without prejudice is 
not a bar to a second action and that collateral estoppel will 
not apply. This point is so fundamental that it needs no further 
comment. It should be noted, however, that collateral estoppel 
is not at issue in this case, but, rather, the doctrine of 
equitable estoppel. 
Where Appellant has gone awry is in asserting that Judge 
Sorensen's ruling, i.e. that she was estopped to seek a modifi-
cation of the property settlement, was based solely on the fact 
that her prior suit was dismissed without prejudice as a sanction 
for her failing to submit to discovery deposition or resist the 
motion to strike her complaint. That could be true if one con-
siders only part of what the relevant portion of the Judgment 
stated, and then only if one misconstrues that part. The rele-
vant portion of the Judgment reads as follows: 
a. The property settlement agree-
ment entered into between the parties on 
October 10, 1973 ... is hereby held valid 
and enforceable as between the parties, 
the said defendant having abandoned any 
action to void said agreement, or, ~ 
her conduct, having bee~ estopped from 
asserting any claim for voidance thereof. 
(emphasis added) 
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The Appellant, in making her argument, apparently has 
ignored the alternative portion of the Judgment which is under-
lined above. Also, Appellant has misconstrued that portion of 
the Judgment which states "the said defendant having abandoned 
any action to void said agreement." The misinterpreted portion 
of the Judgment by Appellant will be discussed at this point; 
the underlined portion of the above-referenced Judgment will 
be analyzed, infra. 
Judge Sorensen did not base the portion of the Judgment on 
which defendant relies merely on the fact that her prior action 
was dismissed. Although the Court's decision was based in part 
on that fact (see, Findings of Fact, Paragraph 5), it relied 
heavily on her other conduct to find that she had "abandoned any 
action to void said argument." This is pointed out in the 
court's conclusions of Law, Paragraph 2, where it was held: 
2. Defendant LaRae Victor Parkes 
has by her conduct abandoned any and 
all claims for rescission or voidance of 
the terms and provisions of the settle-
ment agreement entered into by the 
parties on October 10, 1973; and she is 
~ her conduct barred and estopped from 
seeking relief therefrom in this action. 
(emphasis added) 
An analysis of the Appellant's "conduct" relating to the 
abandonment of her action reveals that the dismissal of her 
complaint because of her repeated failure to attend her deposition 
was only one factor the Court relied on, and not the only factor 
as asserted by Appellant. Appellant offered no testimony at 
trial regarding the circumstances surrounding the dismissal of 
-8-
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the complaint. She clearly had the opportunity to do so while on 
the witness stand. 
After Appellant's action was dismissed on September 25, 1978 
she made no effort to refile a complaint. In an effort to settle 
the property rights of the parties once and for all, Respondent 
on November 21, 1978 filed a complaint. Appellant now asserts 
that she could have filed another complaint similar to the one 
dismissed if Respondent had not "beat her to it." There was no 
"hot" race to the courthouse in this case. Appellant could have 
in effect filed a similar complaint to the one dismissed by. 
asserting a counterclaim in the present action. She did not. 
Surely, Judge Sorensen relied on this conduct as one factor 
showing her lack of diligence in pursuing her action. (T. 29-
30) It was not until one year later at trial, and after Appellant 
had recently separated from her fourth husband, that she decided 
to reallege her prior claims. These factors, considered together, 
are sufficient to justify Judge Sorensen's conclusion that 
Appellant by her "conduct" abandoned her cause of action. This 
conclusion is reinforced when considered together with the 
conduct of Appellant which had taken place from the time the 
settlement agreement was filed up to the time Appellant had her 
complaint dismissed. These factors will be discussed, infra. 
In any event, it should be noted that the court's Judgment 
was in the alternative; i.e., the court gave two separate and 
distinct grounds for finding that the property settlement was 
valid and should not be modified. This Court's upholding of 
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either ground will be sufficient to sustain the Judgment. The 
second ground will be discussed in the following Point II. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY ESTABLISHES THAT 
APPELLANT'S ACTIONS FROM THE TIME SHE 
SIGNED THE AGREEMENT UNTIL SHE CHAL-
LENGED IT JUSTIFY THE USE OF THE EQUI-
TABLE DOCTRINES OF ESTOPPEL AND LACHES. 
RESPONDENT HAS RELIED ON THESE ACTIONS 
TO HIS DETRIMENT. 
As stated above, the alternative portion of the court's 
Judgment upholds the settlement agreement as valid and enforce-
able because Appellant "by her conduct" is "estopped from 
asserting any claim for voidance thereof." 
The doctrine of equitable estoppel is very appropriate to 
this case. Many Utah cases have commented on the requirements 
for the use of the doctrine. For example, in Farmers & Merch. 
Bank v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 4 Utah 2d 155, 289 P.2d 
1045 (1955) the court stated: 
Equitable estoppel is bottomed upon 
the notion that, when one person makes 
representations to another which warrant 
the latter in acting in a given way, the 
one making such representations will not 
be permitted to change his position when 
such would bring about inequitable 
consequences to the other person, who 
relied on the representations and acted 
thereon in good faith. 
Id. at 1048, citing J.T. Fargason Co. ~Furst, 287 F. 306 (8th 
Cir.). See also, Carnesecca ~ Carnesecca, 572 P.2d 708 {Utah 
1977); J.P. Koch, Inc. v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 534 P.2d 903 
(Utah 1975). 
-10-
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Appellant has made representations to Respondent that would 
justify him in relying on the property agreement as being valid. 
Contrary to Appellant's assertions, the record is full of such 
representations. First, she read the agreement and agreed to it 
by signing it on October 10, 1973. (T. 31, 40-41) Second, she 
discussed the agreement alone with several attorneys shortly 
before or after signing it (T. 50-51) and again manifested her 
acceptance of it by not objecting at that time. Third, she lived 
and abided by the terms of the agreement for over four years and 
with a second and third husband before ever making an objection. 
(T. 32-33) Note, the court specifically found in its Findings of 
Fact that both parties have lived pursuant to the agreement from 
1973 to the present time. (Findings of Fact, Paragraph 4) The 
court further found that Appellant entered into her second, third 
and fourth marriages in reliance on the property settlement. 
(Findings of Fact, Paragraph 4) Last, she executed all documents 
of conveyance to effectuate the terms and provisions of the 
property settlement thus assenting to it. (Findings of Fact, 
Paragraph 4) 
Also, Respondent, in good faith, has relied to his detriment 
on Appellant's representations. Respondent has changed his form 
of livelihood from a dairy farmer to a cattle rancher. (T. 63-66) 
As a result, he has had to purchase new equipment and finance the 
cattle operation which has caused him to incur debt which has 
stayed around $40,000 for the last four years. If Appellant were 
now allowed to force a sale of some of Respondent's cattle or 
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needed grazing land for her benefit, Respondent would be left 
with a larger debt and a diminished capacity to repay it. 
Respondent is making a meager living as a cattle rancher and 
is barely able to support himself and meet his child support 
obligations. His taxable income (loss) for the last five years 
has been as follows: 1978 - $14,000; 1977 - $14,000; 1976 -
( $ 3 5 , 0 0 0) ; 19 7 5 - ( $14 , 0 0 0) ; and 19 7 4 - ( $1 0 , 0 0 0) . ( T. 6 6) 
Respondent will suffer great detriment and damage if any of the 
assets relating to the cattle operation are taken away from him 
at this point in time. 
The record also supports a finding that the related doctrine 
of laches should apply. Appellant, in her Brief, cites Leaver 
v. Grose, No. 16477 (Utah Supreme Court, decided April 2, 1980) 
for the proposition that two elements must be established for the 
defense of laches to apply. First, the lack of diligence on the 
part of the party the doctrine is being asserted against, and 
second, an injury to the party asserting the defense owing to the 
lack of diligence. State of Utah Bulletin, May 1, 1980 at 56. 
Appellant boldly states in relation to the first element 
that there is no evidence in the record to demonstrate the 
reasons for the four year wait in filing her complaint (which was 
later dismissed) or whether it was reasonable or justifiable 
under the circumstances. This is not the case. The record 
clearly reflects reasons for the long wait; however, none of them 
help Appellant. As noted, she read and signed the agreement, 
discussed it privately with several attorneys and she lived under 
-12-
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it with two husbands and for four years. Apparently, she was 
satisfied with it during this time. Certainly it was Appellant's 
burden to establish why her actions in waiting four years were 
reasonable or justifiable. This she did not do. Counsel for 
Appellant "speculates" in her Brief on appeal as to a possible 
explanation for the inaction, to wit: impecuniosity. Such 
"speculation" is completely irrelevant. Appellant had her day in 
court to establish any justification. She cannot now dream up a 
reason which was not supported by evidence at trial. 
Appellant next states that Respondent failed to establish 
the elements of laches. She quotes Papanikolas Bros. Ent. ~ 
Sugarhouse Shopping Center Assoc., 535 P.2d 1256, (Utah 1975) for 
the proposition that laches is not merely delay. By so doing, 
she has apparently conceded to her lack of diligence (first 
element) . She then states that there is no evidence other than 
delay on which the trial court could base a finding on the 
applicability of this defense. This is not so. The evidence 
establishes that the second element, i.e. an injury to the party 
asserting the defense owing to such lack of diligence, is present. 
The injury to Respondent caused by his detrimental reliance on 
Appellant's actions was discussed above. 
This Court noted in Papanikolas, supra, that a reviewing 
Court must tread lightly in interfering with the trial court's 
discretion in this area. The court stated: 
The existence of laches is one to 
be determined primarily by the trial 
court; and reviewing courts will not 
-13-
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interfere with the exercise of the trial 
court's discretion in the matter, unless 
it appears that a manifest injustice has 
been done, or the decision cannot 
reasonably be supported by the evidence. 
Id. at 1260. 
The decision of the trial court is clearly supported by the 
evidence and no injustice has been shown that would require any 
different division of the marital property than that agreed to and 
accomplished by the parties four years earlier. 
POINT III 
ALTHOUGH THE DISTRICT COURT HAS DISCRETIONARY 
AUTHORITY BY STATUTE TO MODIFY A PROPERTY 
SETTLEMENT ENTERED INTO BY THE PARTIES, IT 
NEED NOT DO SO WHERE BOTH PARTIES AGREED TO 
IT ORIGINALLY AND WHERE A PARTY'S SUBSEQUENT 
CONDUCT JUSTIFIES THE USE OF THE EQUITABLE 
DOCTRINES OF ESTOPPEL AND LACHES. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 30-3-5(1) states: 
When a decree of divorce is made, 
the court may make such orders in rela-
tion to the:-=-.property and parties ..• 
as may be equitable. The court shall 
have continuing jurisdiction to make 
such subsequent changes or new orders 
with respect to ... the distribution of 
the property as shall be reasonable and 
necessary. (emphasis added) 
The language of the statute is permissive, not mandatory as 
Appellant would like the Court to believe. Although the lower 
court was not required to, it did take testimony as to the fair-
ness of the property distribution. It was established that 
Appellant received a mobile home at a cost of $15,699.40, a two-
year old Ford LTD, and $50 a month per child for child support. 
(See, Statement of Facts, supra.) 
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As to the items of property Mr. Abbott received and the 
court's scrutiny of those items, the following excerpt from the 
trial transcript is relevant: 
MR. WILKERSON: ... our position is 
that in looking at the property of the 
parties, both listed in the settlement 
agreement and his answers to interroga-
tories, we say this was not an equitable 
contract and the court of law is not 
bound to follow it. As you can see he 
received all of the real property and 
most of the personal property. 
THE COURT: I take it that was an 
operating, going dairy business, is that 
correct? Is there anything in Paragraph 
5, except for the mining interests at 
the tail end of it, that do not bear 
directly on the dairy operation? 
*** 
THE COURT: All right. What I am 
going to do is I am going to recess ... 
See if you can determine ... if there is 
any property in the rest of Paragraph 5 
that is not directly involved in the 
dairy operation. 
*** 
MR. HINTZE: Your Honor, as to also 
identify those items under number five 
of the property settlement agreement 
which did not directly pertain to the 
operation of the dairy business, we have 
agreed on five and disagree on a couple 
of others. But the ones that we do 
agree on is that the 1963 Cadillac which 
was then ten years old was not used 
directly in the dairy. 
THE COURT: There is a diminimous 
rule there. 
MR. HINTZE: And the 1955 Ford 
Fairlane, which was an eighteen year old 
vehicle 
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THE COURT: The diminimous rule 
applies there too, doesn't it? 
MR. HINTZE: Yes. A Hydroswift 
boat purchased used for a Thousand 
Dollars. I don't know how many years 
before 1973. 
THE COURT: I guess the cemetary 
lot isn't used in the dairy business 
either. 
MR. HINTZE: The Suzuki motorcycle 
and the cemetery lot. Those five we 
would acknowledge do not have a direct 
relationship with the operation of the 
dairy. The balance of those items we 
submit, Your Honor, are directly related 
to the operation of the dairy, and Mr. 
Wilkerson takes exception to a couple of 
those. 
MR. WILKERSON: We take exception 
to the fact that the shares of stock 
would necessarily have to be included to 
operate the dairy. 
THE COURT: You mean General Dairies, 
Inc. in Highland Dairy? 
MR. WILKERSON: Yes. They may have 
been obtained through the process of 
operating the dairy, but they are not 
necessary to the operation of it. 
THE COURT: Very well. 
(T. 24-25, 27-28) 
Although the court did not feel the need to incorporate a 
finding of the fairness of the property settlement into its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law because of the appli-
cation of the doctrines of abandonment, estoppel and laches, it 
can be inferred that the court was satisfied with the property 
division. Respondent received those items which were necessary 
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to the operation of the dairy. Those items were necessary for 
Respondent to (1) make a living, (2) meet his child support 
obligations, and (3) make the monthly payments on Appellant's 
mobile home. (These payments have been kept current at all 
times.) (T. 24) In addition to the dairy assets and the debts 
associated with them, Respondent received a few other items most 
of which the court ruled to be diminimous; moreover, Respondent 
also assumed the debt on the mobile home. This was not a "mani-
festly unjust" settlement. Under Utah Code Annotated, Section 
30-3-5(1), the court clearly had the discretion whether or not to 
modify the settlement agreement and the court did not abuse its 
discretion in refusing to do so under the facts of this case. 
Certainly it did not merely "rubberstamp" the previous agreement 
as Appellant charges. The court's decision was made after taking 
testimony as to who received what and after considering all of 
the facts unique to the case. 
Appellant's last argument is that the court's discretion 
under Utah Code Annotated, Section 30-3-5(1), to modify a pro-
perty settlement cannot be totally defeated by a contract or 
agreement between the divorcing parties. While Respondent takes 
no issue with this proposition as a general rule, it has always 
been the rule that each such application of said rule is on an 
ad hoc basis. Appellant cites three cases -as authority for the 
court to disregard the settlement agreement and remand this case 
to the District court for a modification of it. The application 
of the principles from these cases to the facts of this case is 
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at best questionable. 
The reliance which the Appellant places on Callister v. 
Callister, 1 Utah 2d 34, 261 P.2d 944 (1953) is totally unfounded. 
Appellant reasons from Callister that a court can disregard a 
property settlement argument entered into by the parties because 
in the middle of an emotional period of marriage breakdown or 
separation or divorce, the parties may agree to a division which, 
in light of all the circumstances, may be unfair. The problem 
with this argument is that Appellant was not in the middle of 
such an emotional period when she entered into the agreement. 
The couple had been divorced for over a year and Appellant was 
remarried at the time the property agreement was entered into. 
No allegation nor proof was made of fraud, duress or undue 
influence. 
Appellant's reliance on Mathie ~Mathie, 12 Utah 2d 116, 
363 P.2d 779 (1961) is likewise unfounded. In Mathie the Court 
recognized that a District Court could make a property division 
inconsistent with a contract entered into between the parties. 
Moreover, as noted by Appellant, the Court stated that careful 
scrutiny should be given to such agreements before they are given 
effect. Id. at 784. The problem with relying on Mathie is that 
the facts were far from similar to the instant case. In Mathie 
the plaintiff, who was granted a Decree of Divorce, was appealing 
the property disposition made therein. The parties in that case 
had not lived under the agreement for years and without com-
plaining of it as in this action. There were no grounds for the 
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application of estoppel, abandonment or laches in that case. 
Neither did the case involve an unproductive family farm which 
was being retained by the husband in order to make a meager 
living and meet his support obligations. And last, it did not 
involve an ex-wife who was complaining of the agreement only 
after receiving all of the benefits provided to her under the 
agreement. 
The case of Pearson v. Pearson, 561 P.2d 1080 (Utah 1977) 
likewise involved an appeal from a divorce proceeding contesting 
a division of the property made by the trial court that was 
different from the parties' stipulation. The case contains none 
of the unique facts of the instant action that transpired since 
the adoption of the agreement by the parties. 
This Court in Blair ~Blair, 40 Utah 306, 121 P. 19 (1912) 
pointed out the great discretion a trial judge has in awarding 
permanent alimony in divorce actions. The District Court had 
awarded the ex-wife $4,500 in permanent alimony while allowing 
the husband to retain farm property which was not very productive 
but which had a value of around $40,000 and which he had accumu-
lated before the marriage. This Court upheld the distribution 
finding that it was not so inequitable or inadequate as to 
justify reversal on the ground of abuse of discretion. The Court 
noted that in awarding alimony and fixing the amount thereof, 
the trial court should consider all of the circumstances of the 
particular case such as, among other things, the amount of pro-
perty owned by the husband, his capabilities and opportunities 
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for earning money, and whether or not the husband's property is 
productive. Id. at 21. The Court specifically noted that the 
property in question consisted principally of farming lands and 
improvements thereon, and was not very productive. Id. The 
Court in Blair seemed to place primary importance on the fact 
that the husband relied on the farm as a source of meager income. 
In Anderson ~Anderson, 18 Utah 2d 286, 422 P.2d 192 (1967) 
this Court stated in reliance on Blair: 
The court frequently emphasizes 
that "no firm rule can be uniformly 
applied in all divorce cases, .•• each 
must be determined upon the basis of the 
immediate fact situation .... [R]ecent 
pronouncements of this court, and the 
policy to which we adhere, are to the 
effect that the trial judge has con-
siderable latitude of discretion in such 
matters and that his judgment should not 
be changed lightly, and in fact, not at 
all, unless it works such a manifest 
injustice or inequity as to indicate a 
clear abuse of discretion. 
The extent of this discretion is 
emphasized by the great disparity of 
results allowed in differing factual 
situations. In Blair v. Blair, 40 Utah 
306, 121 P. 19, 38 L.R:A., N.S., 269 
(1912), the court upheld a property 
division awarding $40,000 to the husband 
and $4,500 to the wife, even though the 
divorce had been granted in her favor. 
At the other extreme, in Wilson, supra, 
where "the court awarded her substantially 
all of the property possessed by the 
parties" (in excess of $20,000 to the 
wife and approximately $500 to the 
husband}, the decree was also affirmed. 
Anderson at 192-93 
Based on the facts of the instant case, the trial court 
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clearly did not abuse its discretion in refusing to modify the 
property settlement agreement. The alleged disparity, if any, 
of the property division in the agreement is not patently 
"inequitable" considering the nature and source of the real 
property, and its use, value and productivity. It was not 
challenged, and when the subsequent acts and omissions of the 
Appellant are taken into consideration, the trial court's deci-
sion should be upheld with greater justification. Moreover, the 
court found in its Judgment that the settlement agreement was 
"valid and enforceable as between the parties"; this is tanta-
mount to finding that there was nothing so inequitable as to 
suggest the agreement be revised by the court. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the facts of this case and the applicable rules of 
law, the Respondent requests that this Honorable Court affirm the 
judgment of the lower court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
~a~)~ 
Harold A. Hintze 
FOX, EDWARDS & GARDINER 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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